Stavropol, Stavropol, Russian Federation
UDC 338.28
Introduction. Countering the shadow economy in the context of the active development of digital platforms requires an algorithm for selecting tools that takes into account potential behavioural responses of taxpayers to the actions of regulatory authorities. This algorithm has been partially implemented in the process of introducing a risk-oriented approach into the tax administration mechanism. Currently, compliance with tax legislation is an individual choice influenced by a set of network interactions and the external environment. Methods. In the article, data from national fiscal authorities were used to assess informal employment in the platform economy, and a retrospective analysis method was employed to analyse the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on taxpayer behaviour and the actions of tax authorities. Results. The emergence of the platform economy and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic have shown that simply introducing control tools or tightening the existing tax administration system to improve tax discipline and reduce the scale of the shadow economy is ineffective. The combination of direct and indirect tools available to the government needs to be integrated into a unified mechanism designed for the long term. Public modalities can be implemented to stimulate and legitimise relationships with tax authorities based on the creation of public partnerships that provide financial incentives. The organisation of access to such incentives should take into account the possibility of abuse of tax benefits. Competition among digital platforms is an effective tool in the arsenal of tax authorities for mobilising tax revenues by reducing the scale of the shadow economy. Financial incentives to increase or develop client bases are particularly relevant, especially for small enterprises that can compete in narrow markets with low profitability, as they possess high adaptability to technological changes and innovations and can become a strong legitimising force for tax authorities seeking to diminish the benefits of tax evasion schemes using digital platforms.
shadow economy, platform economy, tax control, tax administration
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